In this Comment, I argue that since confessions are among the most, if not the most, prejudicial pieces of evidence presented at criminal trials, in order to deter police and compensate victims of police-fabricated confessions under Section 1983, courts should apply a but-for causation rule similar to the exclusionary rule. Just as courts use the exclusionary rule to exclude all derivative evidence through the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, courts should use the proposed "poison from the poisonous tree" doctrine to trace all of the harms that stem from the use of a fabricated confession in analyzing the Section 1983 claim; not just those harms that are shown to have been foreseeable or direct consequences of the use of that confession. The courts that have addressed these Section 1983 claims have not directly applied but-for causation. However, this is the theory by which the cases can be reconciled.
In Part I of this Comment, I discuss the weight afforded to confessions in the criminal process, standards of confession admissibility, and the exclusionary rule. In Part II, I address the requirements for bringing Section 1983 claims, and the immunities afforded officials. In Part III, I lay out the "poisons" doctrine, and argue for a but-for causation standard in Section 1983 claims for police-fabricated confessions.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS

A. Confessions Are among the Most Damaging Forms of Evidence
Manufacturing fabricated evidence to use in a criminal proceeding is a "gravely serious wrong."' Fabricating a confession has an even greater potential for harm, due to a confession's impact on juries and the criminal process as a whole. The Supreme Court first described the impact of confessions on the criminal process in 1884, when it stated that "a deliberate, voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law, and constitutes the strongest evidence against the party making it." '2 Commentators have stated that a confession is the most influential evidence and is in effect a guilty plea, 3 turning the presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt.'
B. Admissibility Standards for Confessions
Since confessions may be so harmful, courts examine confessions with great scrutiny before admitting them into evidence. The admissibility requirements for confessions help to ensure that a fabricated confession will not be used at a trial to convict a criminal defendant. Due process requires that a confession be voluntary. 4 Involuntary, coerced, false, and fabricated confessions are not admitted into evidence because they offend fundamental principles of criminal procedure."
To prevent the admission of such evidence, confessions are examined from two perspectives: the voluntariness of the accused in confessing,' 6 and the actions undertaken by law enforcement officials to obtain the confession." Historically, confessions that have been held to be inadmissible within this framework include those induced by violence or fear, or promises to confer benefits upon the accused."
Thus, these procedural safeguards are meant to protect a victim of an improper confession from conviction. These safeguards are used not "to shield the wicked," but to protect the innocent. '9 For the innocent victims, however, this may be too little, too late. Admissibility 14 See Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278, 286-87 (1936) . 15 See Rogers v Richmond, 365 US 534, 541 (1961) (" [T] he methods used to extract [such confessions] offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system."). See also Spano v New York, 360 US 315,320-21 (1959):
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves. 16 See, for example, Hopt, 110 US at 584 ("A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character."). 17 See, for example, Lego v Twomey, 404 US 477,485 (1972) ("The use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles."). 18 See Brown, 297 US at 284,287 (reversing a conviction based in part on a confession coerced by whipping); Bram v United States, 168 US 532, 561-63 (1897) (holding a confession inadmissible where the accused was forced to remove his clothes during an interrogation, and made to believe that his silence would implicate him); Sorenson v United States, 143 F 820, 824 (8th Cir 1906) (reversing a conviction because the confession was obtained after the accused was told that the matter would be "overlooked in state court," which was an unlawful promise of benefits). Use of deception or trickery, though frowned upon, has been admitted as long as it did not produce a false confession. standards do nothing to protect the defendant from harms other than conviction.
C. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule, like the admissibility standard, is meant to keep improper evidence out of the courts. However, it is designed to work earlier in the process. By weakening the prosecution's case, the exclusionary rule is meant to deter police from improperly obtaining evidence. It requires the exclusion of evidence directly obtained by improper means, as well as any derivative evidence -referred to as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."' The "poison from the poisonous tree" doctrine I propose complements the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule dictates that any wrongfully obtained evidence cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the wrongful conduct. 1 The rule affects: (1) illegal searches and seizures; (2) illegally obtained confessions; (3) illegally secured identification testimony such as improper line-ups; and (4) evidence obtained through other police methods that "shock the conscience.""
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect individuals' constitutional rights to be free from illegal searches and seizures from governmental abuses." The rule does this through deterrence but not through personal compensation.] In Elkins v United States," the Court stated that the exclusionary rule is "calculated to prevent, not to repair. ' 347-48 (1974) (stating that the purpose of the rule is to safeguard constitutional rights "generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved"). 
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Id at 217. The Supreme Court has additionally stated that a purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to promote judicial integrity. See, for example, Mapp, 367 US at 659 (stating that one of the considerations that led to the exclusionary rule was "the imperative of judicial integrity"), quoting Elkins, 364 US at 222. However, it has since assimilated this rationale to that of deterrence. See 
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clarified that the purpose of the rule is to safeguard constitutional rights "generally through its deterrent effect, rather than [vindicate] a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." ' ' The primary way in which the exclusionary rule achieves this deterrence is through the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Under this rule, any evidence that is obtained as a direct or indirect result of the use of the improper methods outlined above is excluded. The fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine is comparable to but-for causation analysis in tort law. There are, however, three categories of evidence that are not subject to the exclusionary rule. These exceptions to the rule are: where the link between the evidence and the illegal conduct is too attenuated, 9 where evidence is gained from an independent source, 3 or where evidence would have eventually been discovered through lawful means."
If the "poisonous tree" is an improperly obtained confession, any information received because of that confession is excluded as "forbidden fruit. ' ' 3 For example, when courts exclude statements made during unduly improper interrogations, any information obtained as a result of those statements are excluded, in addition to the ill-gotten statements themselves. 33 However, where the improperly obtained 28 Id at 347-48.
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See Nardone, 308 US at 341 (reviewing the connection between an illegal wiretap and other evidence in the government's case, finding that "[als a matter of good sense, [ ] such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint"). But see Taylor v Alabama, 457 US 687, 693 (1982) (holding that fingerprints, themselves the fruit of an illegal arrest, "used to extract the confession from petitioner, cannot be deemed sufficient 'attenuation' to break the connection between the illegal arrest and the confession merely because they also formed the basis for an arrest warrant that was filed while petitioner was being interrogated"). 30 This gives rise to the major hole in the exclusionary rule about which this Comment is concerned: Since there are no "fruits" to be excluded in the event of a fabricated confession, the rule does not fulfill the goal of deterrence for which it was designed. The police may take the chance that they will not get caught fabricating a confession and that a court will believe that the fabricated confession was authentic. Even if they do get caught, the police do not lose much, since the only work they put into the fabricated confession was creating it, and the case against the defendant is not harmed beyond the exclusion of the confession. Consequently, the police may be under-deterred from fabricating confessions.' The exclusionary rule is criticized for not deterring misconduct as much as a damages remedy would. 35 If this is a valid criticism, then where the improperly obtained evidence is a police-fabricated confession, the under-deterrence problem is much worse.
The "poison from the poisonous tree" doctrine that I propose would actually deter the police officers from engaging in this behavior, as well as compensate victims for the harms they suffer during the criminal process. By holding an officer personally liable for all damages to the individual, a Section 1983 suit would compensate the victim and at the same time deter future misconduct. As in intentional torts, there should be no concern of over-deterrence-the optimal level of fabricated confessions is zero.
II. SECTION 1983 LAW AND POLICE-FABRICATED CONFESSIONS
The use of a fabricated confession may violate constitutional rights, even if the suspect is not ultimately prosecuted. Police officers are not immune from Section 1983 claims for these harms. However, evidence obtained from un-Mirandized statements must be suppressed, even if the statements are voluntary, because failure to give Miranda warnings is per se a Fifth Amendment violation). 34 This puts to the side the fact that most police officers are honest and have many moral reasons not to fabricate a confession. Although in most cases, native morality is a sufficient deterrent, the optimal level of fabricated confessions is zero. There is no risk of over-deterrence from the proposed "poisons" rule. There is also only a minimal risk that this rule would deter the police from engaging in legitimate police activity. This risk is discussed in Part III.E.2. 424 (stating that exclusion is "a way of restoring the parties to the status quo ante"). But see Irvine v California, 347 US 128, 136-37 (1954) (stating that the goal of exclusion is deterrence and not compensation, and that it "protects one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless [activities]").
suspects must show that the fabricated confession is a but-for cause of the harm they suffered-that there actually is poison that flows from the poisonous tree.
A. Standards for Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 provides a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights by a state actor acting under color of state law.6 To maintain a Section 1983 claim against a state official, such as a police officer, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the alleged conduct was committed by an official acting within the scope of his authority; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law or the Constitution.
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In enacting the statute, Congress meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights by an official's abuse of his position." Section 1983 "was intended to create 'a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution.
' 39 Section 1983 damages both compensate the victim and deter misconduct.4°T Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 37 See Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527,535 (1981):
[I]n any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) proper where the police fabricate a confession and use it in a criminal proceeding, because, in that case, a defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. 2 As a form of tort liability, Section 1983 claims must be examined under the same set of rules that govern general tort law. 3 This standard is designed "to implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights."' Thus, the claimant must establish four elements to maintain a Section 1983 claim: (1) a right enjoyed by the plaintiff under federal law or the Constitution is implicated; (2) the legal or Constitutional right has been violated; the violation was (3) the cause of (4) a harm to the plaintiff. The case law demonstrates that where the police fabricate a confession and it is used during the criminal process, a victim has a claim for relief under Section 1983 for harms they would not have suffered but for the fabrication.
The first case to raise a Section 1983 claim for a fabricated confession was Ricciuti v NYC Transit Authority, 5 in which the Caucasian defendant was arrested for fighting with an African-American man outside of Yankee Stadium. After the arrest, an officer included in the memo of the altercation a statement wherein Ricciuti allegedly used racially derogatory words while admitting to the fight4 The supposed confession, however, was fabricated by the officer." Nonetheless, this statement led to a bias investigation and ultimately an added charge of a racially motivated crime, which involved more severe penalties. As a result, Ricciuti brought a Section 1983 action. The Second Circuit denied summary judgment to the police officers and stated that when a police officer fabricates information that may influence a jury and forwards the information to prosecutors, "he violates the suspect's constitutional right to a fair trial.
4 ' Because of the constitutional violation, the fabrication was actionable under Section 1983. ' The court urged that if officers were able to fabricate conthority... [the] arrest is not unconstitutional, and a complaint based on such an arrest is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim"). Perhaps more importantly, the court also addressed the scope of the claim. Even though Ricciuti's prosecution never went to trial, 2 the Second Circuit held that the potential of the fabrication being used at trial deprived Ricciuti of his rights to a fair proceeding.
" Since the court extended the constitutional protection of a fair trial to a protection of the process leading up to a potential trial, it was able to conclude that the use of the fabrication in the investigation and indictment was actionable under Section 1983.-" In addition to showing that the police violated a constitutional right, the aggrieved party must demonstrate that he was actually harmed by the officer's actions in fabricating the confession. Even if the plaintiff demonstrates the use of a false or partially false confession, if he is unable to show harms he may not recover under Section 1983.
In Stepp v Mangold,' a police officer prepared a confession for Stepp to sign after he was arrested on robbery charges. 7 Stepp signed the first two pages but refused to sign the others because "they referred to ... robberies other than the ones to which Stepp had confessed. ' ' " In spite of his refusal to confess, Stepp was tried for those additional robberies. However, there was no evidence that the unsigned confessions caused the initiation of the criminal prosecution, and there were independent reasons to arrest and prosecute him for 51 
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See id. 54 In the subsequent trial, the jury rejected Ricciuti's factual claims and believed the police officers See Ricciuti v NYC Transit Authority, 70 F Supp 2d 300,332 (SD NY 1999). Furthermore, the court decided that even if the jury believed Ricciuti, the appropriate damages would have been nominal damages of $1 because all charges were dropped (so there was no unfair trial), and his one night in jail would have happened anyway because there was independent authority for the arrest. See id. See also Part III.E.1. Although the fabrication constituted a constitutional violation, the plaintiff did not prove any actual damages. See Ricciuti, 70 F Supp 2d at 332. It however, Ricciuti would have had to answer the additional charge in a criminal trial, or if he would have suffered additional harms because of the fabrication, then the damages certainly would have been different. 55 See Stepp v Mangold, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 8633, *20 (ED Pa) (granting summary judgment in favor of the police because Stepp failed to show that he was actually harmed).
56 1998 US Dist LEXIS 8633 (ED Pa). 57 Id at *2.
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Id. Furthermore, the officer did not change the written confession even after Stepp informed him of the error. those additional robberies. 59 As a result, the court hearing Stepp's Section 1983 action granted summary judgment in favor of the police officer. Although the police fabricated a confession, it held that, but for the confession, Stepp's status would have been the same. '° Thus, the court found the police officer not liable, concluding the "[police] actions were reprehensible, but did not cause Stepp's erroneous conviction.
, 61
Similarly, courts have held that where the criminal process would have continued in the same manner as it did, with or without the fabricated confession, the fabrication was not a but-for cause of the harms of the process. Therefore, there was no cognizable Section 1983 claim. For instance, in Hennick v Bowling, 2 the police allegedly included a fabricated confession in their police report. 7 Although the charges against the defendant were ultimately dismissed, there were independent grounds for the arrest, and so there was no harm but for the fabrication.' The court rejected the plaintiff's claims that the confession amounted to a constitutional violation, noting that there was probable cause independent of the confession to arrest the plaintiff.
'
Any emotional or financial injuries suffered as a result of the arrest were not of a constitutional dimension because there was independent evidence and authority for that arrest.6 In its analysis, the district court in Hennick addressed the Ricciuti decision and stated that the Second Circuit was wrong in holding that the officer who fabricated confession was subject to a Section 1983 claim, because the deprivation of liberty in Ricciuti's case stemmed from circumstances independent of the confession. 7 However, Hennick and Ricciuti can be reconciled without calling into question the logic of Ricciuti. These cases can be distinguished on the grounds that the fabricated confession in Ricciuti affected the criminal process (resulting in the higher charges), whereas the fabricated confession in Hennick did not change the defendant's status at all. In other words, but for the confession in Hennick, the defendant would have been in 59 See id at *13. 60 See id at *23. 61 Id. Id at 1204. 64 See id at 1206-07.
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See id at 1207. 66 See id at 1209 (stating that injuries such as "extra defense costs, injury to reputation, prosecution with malice, [and] emotional distress ... are not of constitutional dimension and cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim"). 67 See id at 1208. the same position; however, but for the confession in Ricciuti, the defendant would not have had to answer an additional charge.
B. Section 1983 Immunities
In addition to the requirements that the plaintiff show causation and harm, Section 1983 claims are limited by the availability of official immunities. There are two types of immunities potentially available to governmental officials: absolute and qualified. Absolute immunity is a status immunity that protects an official from any and all liability for actions taken within the scope of his official functions.-Qualified immunity, on the other hand, shields officials from liability for discretionary acts only insofar as they do not violate clearly established constitutional rights.' 9 Neither immunity is available to police officers who fabricate confessions.
Absolute immunity in the fabricated confession context.
Absolute immunity from Section 1983 actions is the exception rather than the rule. It is available only to those actors who are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."" 0 This generally includes two classes of actors: witnesses, and judges and prosecutors in the performance of their duties.
For example, absolute immunity protects a prosecutor for her functions as an advocate, but not when she acts in an investigatory or administrative capacity. That is, immunity attaches to the office, not the person. Although police officers are not protected by absolute immunity in most of their functions, they are shielded from Section 1983 actions when they act as witnesses or otherwise provide testimony. 73 This immunity is granted on the policy grounds that in order for officers to fully contribute to the judicial process, they must be afforded absolute immunity for their testimony." However, granting ab- Fabricating a confession or evidence is a clear constitutional violation if it is used during the criminal process, and hence officers who fabricate confessions are not protected by qualified immunity. ' The right not to have a fabricated confession used in a criminal proceeding is "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."' Therefore, as recognized in the case law, police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for such conduct.
In Jones v Cannon, M for example, the Eleventh Circuit denied qualified immunity to the arresting officer for fabricating Jones's murder confession, and subsequently arresting Jones solely on the basis of the confession. 87 The court stated that since the fabricated confession was the only probable cause for the warrantless arrest, and that no "reasonable police officer" would have thought there was probable cause to arrest Jones, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity."'
III. THE POISON FROM THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE
In this Part, I propose guidelines for how a court should evaluate a Section 1983 claim stemming from a police-fabricated confession. Under conventional tort-law analysis, the use of a fabricated confession would be the breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, namely with respect to his Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Causation should be determined using a form of but-for causation, similar in its effect to the exclusionary rule. This, in turn, would entitle the plaintiff to damages for all harms that were the result of the deprivation of his rights.
A. The Constitutional Right Implicated (Duty)
A plaintiff must show an official duty to make out a Section 1983 claim." It is clear that if the state obtains a conviction or makes an arrest as a result of the fabricated confession, the detainee's constitutional rights have been violated.90 However, there is disagreement over 84 See, for example, Buckley, 509 US at 276. whether bringing charges against a suspect on the basis of fabricated evidence is a constitutional violation in and of itself. 9 Depending on the individual facts of a case, a plaintiff would most likely have either a Fourth Amendment claim for a pretrial deprivation of liberty, or a Fourteenth Amendment claim for a deprivation of his right to a fair trial. Furthermore, the plaintiff could state a claim that the presumption of innocence owed to him92 was turned into a presumption of guilt due to the strength afforded a confession. Consequently, there are many potential federal rights that could be implicated depending on the facts of the case. What is clear, however, is that constitutional duties are implicated when a police officer fabricates a confession during the criminal process.
B. The Use (Breach)
In order for there to have been a constitutional violation, the fabricated confession must not only be manufactured, it must be used by the police in a criminal proceeding. 93 In Zahrey v Coffey,4' the Second Circuit stated that if the basis of a claim was only that the evidence was fabricated, and the existence of the false evidence "did nothing to precipitate the sequence of events that resulted in a deprivation of [ ] liberty," there would be no constitutional violation." For example, if an officer put the statement "in a drawer, or framed it and hung it on the wall but took no other step," there would be no violation.9 On the 91 Compare Devereaux v Abbey, 263 F3d 1070,1074-75 (9th Cir 2001) ("[Tlhere is a clearly established right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false evidence."); Ricciuti, 124 F3d at 130, with Hennick, 115 F Supp 2d at 1208-09 (holding that since the plaintiff was not tried, "the most that can be said is that the false confession had the potential to, but did not, impinge on [the plaintiff's] rights," even though the fabricated confession led to police charging the plaintiff).
9
The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is "undoubted" law; an "axiomatic and elementary" principle the enforcement of which "lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. other hand, fabricating a confession to a court or to a grand jury in a trial or probable cause hearing constitutes a use of the confession. ' The "use" of the confession extends beyond presenting it at a trial or grand jury. For example, where an officer relies on a fabricated confession as probable cause for an arrest warrant," or gives it to a prosecutor as evidence,99 the confession is clearly "used." This use is a breach of the constitutional duties discussed in the previous Part. In sum, the action component of a constitutional violation is satisfied when the police-fabricated confession is employed during a criminal investigation or proceeding.
C. But-For Causation
Although tort law generally requires some theory of proximate cause to limit the tortfeasor's liability to that for which he is reasonably responsible, in analyzing Section 1983 actions for fabricated confessions, a but-for causation rule should be employed. This is essentially what the courts that heard these claims have collectively decided. Under this standard, a plaintiff must prove that the policefabricated confession was the but-for cause of the deprivation of his constitutional rights."' The alternative, requiring proximate causation analysis, would cut off all liability in fabricated confession suits because, although the police launch a criminal investigation or proceeding, the prosecution brings the action.'° Consequently, under a proximate cause standard, an independent decision that is made by an intermediary, such as a prosecutor, judge, or grand jury, would break the causal chain, and insulate the police officer from legal responsibility." 1 Under a but-for standard of causation, however, an intervening action would not break the causal chain if the police officer deceived, misdi-97 See Whiting v Traylor, 85 F3d 581, 585 n 5 (11th Cir 1996) ("Knowingly making false statements to obtain an arrest warrant" can be the basis for a claim.); McNamara, 59 Alb L Rev at 1992 (cited in note 77) ("Presenting altered or fabricated evidence to a grand jury or court is illegal. When false evidence impedes a fair trial, the defendant's constitutionally protected civil rights are violated.").
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See (noting that the police had nothing "to do with the decision whether or not to prosecute" the plaintiff). 102 See Smith v Gonzalez, 670 F2d 522,526 (5th Cir 1982) (stating that a presentation of a witness by a police officer to an attorney, who then issued an affidavit requesting a warrant, broke the causal chain and insulated the police officer from liability).
As discussed above, the greatest penalty, and thus compensation, available under the exclusionary rule is the exclusion of highly probative evidence." Since "damages are based on harm" and "exclusion on gain, ' ' ... in situations where there is only harm, as in fabricated confession cases, damages provide both the sole remedy and the sole punishment for police who engage in this activity. This level of deterrence is needed because confessions are so potent in their effect. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the exclusionary rule does not effectively deter this conduct, nor does native morality.
The but-for test is appropriate because the link in the causation chain is not broken by any independent authority, so long as the authority relies on the fabricated confession. This piece of "evidence" will consequently harm the criminal defendant from the time it is initially used until it is eventually discovered as having been fabricated. A proximate cause analysis would not recognize that the entire process is altered because of a fabricated confession.
D. Harms to Redress
Any appearance of a fabricated confession at trial denies the criminal defendant a fair trial."9 This is clearly a harm that can be redressed under Section 1983."' Further, since confessions are so potentially damaging, any use of a fabricated confession in the criminal process potentially deprives defendants of a fair proceeding."' To hold otherwise "would make a mockery of the notion that Americans enjoy the protection of due process of the law and fundamental justice."
In addition, the fabricated confession harms the criminal defendant long before the trial. In the criminal justice system, "the most significant sanctions [on the criminal defendant] often are: (1) the arrest itself; (2) the search incident to arrest which may enable the police to charge the suspect with a[n] [ ] offense; and (3) the period spent in jail before the suspect appears in court." ' The fabricated confession changes the entire way the criminal process treats the defendant."' In the words of Malcolm Feeley's classic title, "The Process Is the Pun-ishment...' ' . This wrongful "punishment" is the harm for which the criminal defendant should be compensated under a Section 1983 claim.
E. Limitations on the "Poison from the Poisonous Tree" Rule Similar to the exclusionary rule, the proposed "poison" doctrine would have three limiting principles. These consequences and exceptions balance the police interests of arresting criminals and gaining evidence for prosecution with the interests of innocent defendants in not having a fabricated confession used against them at any point of the criminal process.
Independent grounds for prosecution.
A natural result of the but-for causation rule is that criminal defendants are not compensated when they would have suffered the same harms with or without the fabricated confession. The "fruits" doctrine of the exclusionary rule recognizes that knowledge obtained through improper means is admissible if it was also gained from an independent, proper source."
6 Similarly, if, without the fabricated confession, the evidence would support the actions taken against the criminal defendant -such as an arrest, warrant, or prosecution -then the fabricated confession could be said to have no impact."
7 It follows that a check on the test of whether the "poison" came from the fabricated confession should be the additional inquiry of whether the "real" evidence was sufficient, on its own, for the criminal proceeding or investigation to proceed without the fabricated confession." 8 If other evidence is sufficient, there is no but-for causation, and hence the officer should not be held liable under Section 1983. The fabricated confession cases discussed in Part II follow this rule. In Hennick and Stepp, where the Section 1983 claims could not proceed, there were independent grounds upon which to arrest, and initiate prosecution against, the suspect. In contrast, in Ricciuti and Jones, where the suits were allowed to proceed, the courts held that there was no other authority that would have served as probable cause for an arrest, or led a prosecutor to add charges.
2. Legitimate police practices. The goal behind this rule is not to deter legitimate police activity or to restrain officers from adequately performing their job. Consequently, legitimate practices that involve deception are an exception to the but-for rule. For example, this would apply in situations when police fabricate an accused's (Prisoner A) confession as a trick to obtain a real confession from Prisoner A's accomplice, Prisoner B. The real confessions that arise from this form of police trickery are usually, and should be, admissible at trial. " 9 The situation might occur as follows: The police tell B that A has confessed. In fact, A has not confessed and so A's "confession" is fabricated. Based on this knowledge, B then actually does confess and provides evidence that is harmful to A. But for the fabricated confession, B would not have confessed, and there would not be the added evidence against A. Although this would satisfy the but-for causation requirement of the "poison from the poisonous tree" doctrine, this "legitimate police practice" should not lead to a Section 1983 claim. This exception should be made because it would run counter to the judicial process if a police act were allowed during a criminal trial, but then held to be improper in a civil trial.
Favorable termination of the criminal proceeding.
A final limitation is that in order to state a Section 1983 claim for harms that stem from a police-fabricated confession, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the criminal trial terminated favorably to the suspect.' Favorable terminations include: acquittal, dismissal, reversal, expungement by executive order or judicial expungement, a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, and executive pardons. 
